



The Impacts of Conservation and Militarization on Indigenous Peoples

A Southern African San Perspective

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Abstract

There has been a long-standing debate about the roles of San in the militaries of southern Africa and the prevalence of violence among the Ju/'hoansi and other San people. The evolutionary anthropology and social anthropological debates over the contexts in which violence and warfare occurs among hunters and gatherers are considered, as is the “tribal zone theory” of warfare between states and indigenous people. This paper assesses the issues that arise from these discussions, drawing on data from San in Angola, Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. Utilizing cases of how San have been affected by military forces and wildlife conservation agencies in what became protected areas in southern Africa, this article shows that indigenous peoples have been treated differentially by state and nongovernmental organizations involved in anti-poaching, shoot-to-kill, and forced resettlement policies. Particular emphasis is placed on the !Xun and Khwe San of southern Angola and northern Namibia and the Tshwa San of western Zimbabwe and northern Botswana, who have been impacted by militarization and coercive conservation efforts since the late nineteenth century. Principal conclusions are that conservation and militarization efforts have led to a reduction in land and resources available to indigenous people, higher levels of poverty, increased socioeconomic stratification, and lower levels of physical well-being. San have responded to these trends by engaging in social activism, forming community-based institutions, and pursuing legal actions aimed at obtaining human rights and equitable treatment.

Keywords San · Southern Africa · Militarization · Conservation · Warfare · Genocide · Social activism · Indigenous rights

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Two crucial factors have affected the well-being of San peoples in southern Africa in the past several decades: the military and conservation. There has been a long-standing debate about the roles of San in the militaries of southern Africa (Battistoni and Taylor 2009; Bieseles and Hitchcock 2013:10–11, 114–16; Gordon 2017; Gordon and Douglas 2000:183–209; Grundy 1983; Kolata 1981; Lee and Hurlich 1982; Marshall 2003; Marshall and Ritchie 1984; Sharp and Douglas 1996; Stapleton 2014:242–49; van Wyk 2014; Weinberg 2017). On the one hand, the San were extolled as superb soldiers, anxious to fight and skilled in doing so (Breytenbach 1990, 1997; Linford and Venter 2016; Nortje 2008, 2012; Uys 1993, 2014). On the other hand, the San were characterized as coerced victims of the southern African struggle against apartheid (Guenther 2014; Lee 2013:190–92, 2014). As Battistoni and Taylor (2009:313) note, “Their collaboration with the *apartheid* military has contributed to the construction of Khwe as a ‘subversive’ threat to nation-building.” San perspectives have rarely been taken into account in these discussions (exceptions include Brinkman 2000; Pakleppa 2002; Sapignoli 2018; Taylor 2012; Welch 2013). This article is based on archival work and on detailed interviews of several hundred San and members of other groups who were affected by the Angolan, Namibian, and Zimbabwean civil wars and postcolonial militarized conservation on the part of southern African nation-states.

This article considers the experiences of southern African San, who today number some 130,000 in seven countries (Table 1). The focus is primarily on the ways in which San were affected by the struggles for independence in Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (see Brinkman 2005; Dieckmann et al. 2014; Hitchcock et al. 2016; Huntley 2017; Kreike 2004). Consideration is also given to the impacts of conservation initiatives on San in the region. Sometimes seen as “victims of conservation” in southern Africa, San have also engaged in resistance strategies when confronted with what they see as inequitable applications of conservation policies (Hitchcock 2011; Lenggenghager 2018; Taylor 2012).

Table 1 Numbers of San in Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

Country	Overall population (2018)	Area (km ²)	Numbers of San (National)
Angola	29,310,273	1,246,700	10,500–14,000
Botswana	2,214,858	581,730	63,500
Lesotho	1,958,042	30,355	400
Namibia	2,484,780	824,292	38,000
South Africa	54,341,552	1,219,090	7900
Zambia	15,972,000	752,618	1500
Zimbabwe	13,805,084	390,757	2600
Total	116,657,316	5,045,542	Ca. 130,000

Data from the Southern African Development Community (SADC); *The World Factbook* (2018, accessed at www.cia.gov, 7 December 2018) and *Ethnologue* (www.ethnologue.com), accessed 28 August 2018, and from fieldwork and Nyae Nyae Development Foundation of Namibia (NNDFN), Nyae Nyae Conservancy (NNC), Namibia, Legal Assistance Centre (LAC), Namibia, Desert Research Foundation of Namibia (DFRN), the Marginalized Communities Division (MCD), Namibia, Botswana Khwedom Council (BKC) (Botswana), First People of the Kalahari (FPK) (Botswana), Kuru Family of Organizations (KFO) (Botswana) Kalahari Wildlands Trust (KWT), Botswana, the National KhoeSan Council (South Africa), and the Tsooro-o-tso San Development Trust (TSDT), Zimbabwe

Conservation approaches in southern African nation-states have varied considerably. They range from a strict preservationist approach to community-based conservation in which local people are allowed to benefit from wildlife and other natural resources. All too common in Africa has been a preservationist approach in which biodiversity conservation was achieved through the removals of local people from tracts of land (Brockington and Igoe 2006; Dowie 2009; Duffy 2000, 2010). Sometimes called “fortress conservation,” this approach was employed in the case of Yellowstone National Park, the world’s first national park, in the United States (Spence 1999), as well as in Serengeti National Park and Mkomazi Game Reserve in Tanzania (Brockington 2002; Dowie 2009:26). In essence, this approach consisted of the forced removal of indigenous and other residents of areas declared as protected, often at the hands of government agents or the military.

Related to this approach was coercive conservation, whereby coercive techniques were employed to stop local people from exploiting natural resources, including imposing wildlife access restrictions; engaging in arrests, detentions, and sometimes torture of people suspected of illegally obtaining natural resources; or engaging in deadly shootings of suspected “poachers” (Garland 2008; Marks 2005). Sometimes called “green militarization” or “green wars,” this approach sometimes employs “shoot-to-kill” policies, as seen, for example, in Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa (Büscher 2013; Büscher and Fletcher 2018; Büscher and Ramutsindela 2016; Duffy 2000, 2010; Fletcher 2018; Haas and Ferreira 2018; Hitchcock 1995). Botswana, for example, has opted to have an official, state-declared, shoot-to-kill policy as part of its wildlife conservation efforts since 2014 (Mogomotsi and Kefilwe 2017; *Sunday Standard Reporter* 2017; Tshekedi Khama, statements to Botswana Parliament, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, curated in the National Parliament Archives). Other states besides Botswana have employed shoot-to-kill policies, as seen, for example, in Kruger National Park in South Africa and in Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe, but the governments have not claimed that this action was a stated legal policy of the state.

Community-Based Conservation (CBC) or Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is a participatory approach that allows local communities to take part in conservation and development activities (Hulme and Murphree 2001). Pioneered in Zimbabwe, community-oriented conservation, also known as CAMPFIRE (Communal Management Program for Indigenous Resources), community-based conservation allows local people to benefit from wildlife through jobs, income, and wild animal meat (Rihoy et al. 2010). Sometimes called a “sustainable use” approach; this strategy is aimed at allowing humans to benefit from the exploitation of resources in the habitats in which they live (Martin 2017). Most San say that they prefer the community-based conservation approach, which ensures that they are able to get subsistence and income from natural resources.

Many San see themselves as “conservationists par excellence” (Campbell 1977). They maintain that they obtain only enough resources to sustain themselves, and they say that they do not overexploit wild plant and animal resources. There is a serious debate over this issue (e.g., Hames 2007). Some researchers, safari companies, and conservation organizations argue explicitly that the San do engage in resource overexploitation, which, they say, justifies restrictions being placed on their activities or removals from protected areas (e.g., Owens and Owens 1981, 1984; Spinage 1991). These issues were raised in testimony in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve relocation

case in the High Court of Botswana in 2004–2006 (Sapignoli 2018). Wildlife and ethnographic data in the Central Kalahari did not support the argument that the G//ui, G//ana, Tsila, and other San and Bakgalagadi were overexploiting the wildlife (Arthur Albertson, Maria Sapignoli, Robert Hitchcock, field data). In the past there may have been no overexploitation of the environment and natural resources because of sparse populations and lack of markets, but this may have changed with rapidly growing populations.

There is generally great interest among social scientists to understand the factors that promote peace and reduce violence and those that contribute to violence (Allen and Jones 2014; Bowles 2009; Diamond 2012:151–52, 167, 215; Glowacki and Wrangham 2015; Glowacki et al. 2017; Hames 2019; Micheletti et al. 2018; Mirazón Lahr et al. 2016; Pinker 2011; Wrangham and Glowacki 2012; Wrangham and Peterson 1996). Evolutionary anthropologists seek answers to the following questions: (1) How violent are hunter-gatherers? (2) Under what conditions are hunter-gatherers violent? (3) When violence does occur, what form does it take? Evolutionary researchers are especially interested in violence among hunting and gathering peoples, and much debate in this area has arisen regarding the prevalence of violence among the Ju/'hoansi and other San people (see, e.g., Lee 2014, 2018:515–21). The data provided here contribute to these debates by examining the prevalence of violence in San groups in particular historical and economic contexts.

One topic on which social anthropologists, evolutionary anthropologists, and primatologists focus relates to the territorial behavior of humans and their primate ancestors (Dyson-Hudson and Smith 1978; Langergruber et al. 2017; Lovis and Whallon 2016; Samuni et al. 2018; Sayers and Lovejoy 2008; Wilson and Wrangham 2003; Wrangham and Peterson 1996). It is interesting to examine the territorial behavior of chimpanzees (*Pan troglodytes*); there is evidence that chimpanzees engage in both proactive and reactive aggression (Wrangham 2018). Chimpanzees, like humans, sometimes take part in patrols on the edges of their territories, and in some instances they engage in aggressive behavior toward members of other groups that are close to territorial boundaries or have crossed into a group's own territory (Langergruber et al. 2017; Samuni et al. 2018). Under certain conditions, this is also the case for humans, as can be seen, for example, among San in the Kalahari. Hans-Joachim Heinz (1979; personal communication, 1996) argues that there were boundary conflicts between different San groups (notably, the !Xóð and the G//ui) in the southwestern Kalahari in the 1960s. In the early twentieth century, there were territorial conflicts among Tshwa (Tsua, Tjoa) and other San in the northeastern Kalahari, as noted below.

Wrangham (2018) draws a distinction between two types of aggression: prosocial aggression and reactive aggression (see also Daly 2018). Prosocial aggression consists of a planned and coordinated attack on another group with the intended goal of obtaining a reward for doing it. Reactive aggression consists of a response to a threat such as an insult from another individual or group of individuals (Wrangham 2018:246). Much of the warfare in which San populations were involved in the colonial period of southern Africa can be characterized as indigenous resistance to the expansion of states, much along the lines of the “tribal zone theory” of Ferguson and Whitehead (1992:8–12). This theory argues that indigenous people around the world mounted spirited military responses to the expansion of settler societies and colonial state systems.

San warfare in southern Africa consists of both within-group and between-group warfare. An example of the former can be seen among the Tshwa of the northeastern Kalahari, who in the early twentieth century engaged in warfare with other Tshwa over patches of high value resources such as *mmilo* (*Vangueria infausta*) (Hitchcock field notes, 1976). An example of between-group warfare occurred between Hai//om and !Xun San in north-central Namibia in the latter part of the nineteenth century (Jan Tsamib, personal communication 2018). As will be shown below, in some cases San were drawn into military conflicts between nation-states or guerilla forces and ended up engaging in warfare on behalf of the various institutions that incorporated them as fighters. As Baines (2015:1–11) notes, there are contested narratives and conflicting memories regarding the ways in which participants saw their involvement in the “border war.” This was true, too, for the liberation struggles in Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. The balance of this paper analyzes these issues, looking first at Angola, second at Namibia, and finally at Zimbabwe, and focusing on militarization, conservation, and state policies toward indigenous peoples and minorities.

The Angolan Liberation Struggle and the San

Highly diverse in their adaptations and the kinds of habitats in which they reside, San are found in the savannas of the Kalahari; in the fertile wetlands of southern Angola, western Zambia, western Zimbabwe, and northern Botswana; and in the plains and mountains of South Africa and Lesotho (Fig. 1). The San are some of the best known




Fig. 1 Map of San distribution in Southern Africa. Note: Botswana is in the center of the map between Namibia and Zimbabwe, north of South Africa and south of Zambia

and most intensively studied people on the planet (see Barnard 2007; Kiema 2010; Lee 1979, 2013; Marshall 1976; Marshall-Thomas 1958, 2006; Puckett and Ikeya 2018; Sapignoli 2018; Silberbauer 1981; Takada 2015; Tanaka 2014). In Angola, the San number between 10,500 and 14,000 and thus are potentially the third largest San population in southern Africa after Botswana and Namibia, although estimates vary and relatively little extensive data collection has taken place (Begbie-Clench and Baptistiny 2017; Robins et al. 2001).

Angola differs somewhat from other southern African states in which San are found today, in part because the country experienced colonization by the Portuguese rather than the Dutch, Germans, or British. The San in Angola are sometimes referred to as “Khoisan,” “Bosquimano,” or “Vassequele” (Vasekele), and they have diverse genetic and historical origins (Oliveira et al. 2018). The majority of Angolan San are or were found mainly in the southern provinces of Huila, Cunene, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico (Pakleppa and Kwononoka 2003). In many ways, Angola’s San have had what can only be characterized as a turbulent history, having experienced more than 25 years of civil conflict in Angola as well as transborder conflicts, especially between 1966 and 1974 (Pakleppa and Kwononoka 2003; Robins et al. 2001).

During the course of the Angolan war between the Portuguese and liberation forces, the Portuguese military and their supporters sought to aggregate what had been scattered villages into lines along roads that could provide easy access for the military and “an easy target for the air force to strafe” (Huntley 2017:156). The aggregation into protected villages served to disrupt traditional social, political, and economic organization. Local San were pressed into service as supporters for the military, exposing them to great risk but at the same time giving them options other than working in the fields for other people, as one !Xun told me in 1995 (see also Pakleppa and Kwononoka 2003). San were initially not supplied with weapons, and they were not viewed as “regular” members of militias and were not paid, something that changed later on when the South African Defense Force military units entered the struggle (Breytenbach 1997).

The San were used by all sides in the struggle between the combatants in Angola (the Portuguese and the South Africans versus the liberation forces of the MPLA [Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola], the FNLA [Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola], and UNITA [Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola]) along with Cuban forces. During the course of this struggle, Angolan San, including !Xun, “Vasakela” or Mpungu !Xun, Khwe, Kwis, and Kwerepe, were affected significantly by the fighting and habitat destruction. Many of the Angolan San were relocated into settled villages, and they were also denied access to “no-go” areas, which included protected areas such as the ones in southeastern Angola in the Okavango Basin. The lengthy conflict had considerable impacts on the people of Angola as well as on the planning for conservation and development in the broader region (Rodrigues and Russo 2017).

Several thousand Angolan San were either killed or displaced during this struggle, which has been characterized as a genocide (Souindola 1981), one of a number of genocides committed against indigenous peoples in Africa in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries (Table 2). Interviews of San from Angola and the Caprivi Strip (the slender portion of Namibia that extends to Victoria Falls) described their experiences as part of what became known as the “border war.”

Col. Delville Linford, in a foreword to Ian Uys's 1993 *Bushman Soldiers: Their Alpha and Omega*, made the following comment:

The Bushman soldier is unique in many respects. Born to use a bow and arrow, he learnt to use modern weapons with surprising efficiency, and his incredibly keen senses and thorough knowledge of the bush made him a soldier feared by all that crossed his path (Linford, in Uys 1993:vii).

This position was common among the military officers who served in the border war. Virtually all of the South African Defense Force (SADF) and South West African Territorial Force soldiers who served with San said that they were “superb soldiers.” Uys asked, “What can turn primitive, friendly people into dedicated and professional soldiers?” (1993:1). Some former SADF personnel said in interviews that it was due to their training; others maintained that it was due to “their innate abilities” (interviews conducted by Hitchcock in Namibia and South Africa, 1987, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2015, 2017, 2018; see Appendix Table 4). They were far from “harmless people”; some said they were “dangerous” and were “quick to take up arms against people who threatened them.” A few ex-SADF soldiers said that the San were “genetically predisposed” to violence. Other ex-SADF personnel remarked about how much they enjoyed working with San because of what they felt to be their “peaceful nature.”

Some former SADF soldiers spoke of their ancestors who lost their lives to San poisoned arrows in South Africa in the 1700s and 1800s (for descriptions of San resistance to settler incursions in what is now Namibia and South Africa, see Adhikari 2010; Guenther 2005; Penn 2006). Many San, for their part, see themselves as indigenous peoples who were the “victims of genocide” in Angola, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Some of them have also argued for reparations for what they see as deliberate policies of eradication, much like the Herero and Nama in Namibia, who were mistreated and killed during the first genocide of the twentieth century, perpetrated at the hands of the Germans in South West Africa (Drechsler 1980). !Xun and Khwe San pointed out that, not long after the German-Herero and Nama wars, they, too were exposed to genocide in the early twentieth century (for a discussion of the San genocide in 1912–1915, see Gordon 2009).

During the Angolan civil war, both people and wildlife were decimated (Huntley 2017). Some of the destruction was at the hands of liberation forces; wildlife losses were also due to the activities of the South African Defense Force. Ivory and rhinoceros horn were sold on the open market or trafficked through other channels (e.g., diplomatic ones), mainly to Asia. The resulting funds were used to support covert operations and other activities in support of the South African regime (Ellis 1994; Reeve and Ellis 1995). Some of the information on this illegal wildlife exploitation was covered in a commission of inquiry set up by the South African government in 1996, after independence was achieved in April 1994 (Matloff 1997).

Angolan San were moved out of protected areas that had been established in the 1970s by the Angolan government (Huntley 1974, 2017; !Xun and Khwe informant data, 1987, 1992, 1995, 2001, see Appendix Table 4). Similar efforts to remove San from protected areas occurred in the Caprivi Strip (now the Zambezi Region) of what was then South West Africa (now Namibia) (Taylor 2008, 2012). San who had worked for the South African Defense Force said that they were recruited not just as soldiers

Table 2 Cases of Genocide Involving Indigenous Peoples in Africa

Country	Estimated population (July 2017)	Conflict period(s)	Number(s) of victims	Population below the poverty line	Indigenous group(s)
Angola	29,310,273	11/75–11/94, 12/98–3/2002	4000	56.2%	San
Central African Republic (CAR)	5,625,118	2011–present	5000	48.5%	Baka, Aka
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)	83,301,151	1994–present	4,200,000	71.3%	Mbuti, Efe, and other Batwa, Lese
Ethiopia	105,350,020	2013–present	700	41.2%	Chabu (Shabu)
Rwanda	11,901,484	1963–1964	5000–14,000	51.2%	Hutu, Tutsis, Batwa
		1994	500,000–800,000		
Somalia	11,301,386	1977–1978	100,000	81%*	Isaaq, Hawiye, Eyle (Gabooye)
		1988–1991	60,000		
		1992–1993	500,000		
		2000–present	4000		
South Sudan	13,026,129	1952–1972		40%*	Nuer, Dinka, Shilluk, Mahan
		1983–2005	100,000–500,000		
		2012–present	30,000–50,000		
Sudan	36,108,853	2003–present (Darfur, Nubia)	100,000–500,000, (30,000–50,000)	50%*	Fur, Masalit, Nuba
Uganda	39,570,125	1971–1979	100,000–500,000	37.5%	Bakonjo, Twa, Acholi
		1979–1982	50,000–200,000		
		1997–present	10,000–20,000		
Zimbabwe	13,805,084	1982–1987 ('Gukurahundi')	20,000	56.1%	Ndebele, Kalanga, Tshwa San

Data obtained from the *World Factbook* (2018), Minority Rights Group International (2016), the United Nations Human Development Report (2018); the World Bank (2018), Human Rights Watch (2018), and from government and other NGO sources. The population below the Poverty Datum Line is calculated as the percentage of those people living below \$1.25 per person per day. Some, but not all, of the groups are hunter-gatherers; others are agropastoralists or farmers. Of the victims of genocides, a percentage ranging from 5 to 15% consisted of indigenous people, based on self-identification or identification by others such as researchers or members of nongovernment organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Minority Rights Group International, and Anti-Slavery International

*Estimate from previous figures; no current information available

but also as commercial hunters, ostensibly, they said, because of their hunting and game tracking skills. Wildlife decimation in the war zone was the result of the actions of a large number of actors, some of whom were working on behalf of the state and others who were primarily trying to feed themselves.

San in the Namibia Liberation and Secession Struggles

!Xun, Khwe, and other San were also impacted heavily by the struggle between the South West Africa People's Organization, the Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), and the South African and South West African governments during the liberation war in Namibia (1975–1990). The South African police began to use San as trackers in 1974, and some of the San were tasked with patrolling the border between South West Africa and Botswana, looking for potential incursions (Lee and Hurlich 1982:334; Taylor 2012:73–74). San from Angola and the Caprivi (now Zambezi) Region of South West Africa were recruited by the South African Defense Force as field soldiers in the 1970s and 1980s (Gordon 1988, 2017; Kolata 1981; Uys 2014). Initially brought into the military as trackers and camp workers, San later were used in counterinsurgency operations and full-scale battles that took place in southern Angola.

The South African Defense Force had two major military bases in the Caprivi Region of South West Africa: Alpha and Omega. The San soldiers there, including !Xun and Khwe, received high salaries and their dependents were provided with rations, blankets, and other goods, which some !Xun and Khwe San said were incentives to join the military (Hitchcock 2001; Hitchcock interviews in West Bushmanland in 1987, 1992, 1995, and 2001 and in West Caprivi in 1995, 1999). The quality of San as trackers and “guerilla hunters” were highlighted by South African military personnel (e.g., Breytenbach 1997:80).

The impacts of the militarization of the San have been addressed in detail by a number of researchers (Battistoni and Taylor 2009; Gordon 1988, 2017; Gordon and Douglas 2000; Hitchcock 2001, 2012; Kolata 1981; Lee 1979:428–31, 1986; Lee and Hurlich 1982; Marshall and Ritchie 1984; Robbins 2007; Taylor 2012:73–78; Thatcher 1983). One of the most significant effects of the military presence in northern Namibia and Angola was that some of the San became dependent on the money, food, goods, and services provided by the army. Large amounts of cash were injected into local economies, some of which was spent on alcohol. Social conflict and domestic abuse, especially of women and children, expanded considerably in the areas where the military was present (Marshall 2003; Marshall and Ritchie 1984). The San in Caprivi and Bushmanland were characterized by researchers (e.g., Kolata 1981:563) as deprived of information and therefore relatively poorly equipped to make informed decisions. Other San, however, were fully aware of their situations and made conscious choices to join the military in order to support themselves and their families.

Approximately 1000 San from Angola, the Caprivi Strip, and Kavango were brought to the area that used to be Bushmanland (now Tsumkwe District) by the South African Defense Force in the late 1970s and the early 1980s (Hitchcock 2012; Lee and Hurlich 1982; Welch 2013). Some of the !Xun and Khwe from Angola and northern Namibia were settled at an army base at Mangetti Dune in what was known then as

West Bushmanland, now Nꞑa Jaqna. Tensions between the immigrants and local Ju/'hoansi and !Kung residents of the region were fairly high in the period after the resettlement took place. There were jealousies caused by the flow of money and goods into the region from the South African Defense Force. Some of the !Xun and Khwe who had been allocated plots of land were seen as being collaborators of the SADF, which contributed to intergroup tensions. Economic stratification was seen in the settlements where soldiers were stationed. Essentially, there were a few relatively wealthy people and substantial numbers of poor ones.

In 1978, Bushman Battalion 36 was established in Bushmanland and the SADF began to recruit Ju/'hoansi into the military (Lee and Hurlich 1982:335). Major Pinkie Coetzee of the South African Defense Force was posted to Bushmanland, where he began work on military training and development activities, including provision of assistance in agriculture and livestock keeping. The South African military built roads and drilled boreholes, especially in West Bushmanland (Nꞑa Jaqna). The military's goal was to settle !Xun and Khwe family groups with livestock around each borehole to facilitate their becoming economically self-sufficient. Agriculture was also attempted, but yields were low. Discussions with !Xun and Khwe residents of West Bushmanland in 1992 revealed that few people felt that they were self-sufficient, and they said that they were still reliant on the support of faith-based organizations for food and commodities (e.g., the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Namibia, ELCIN). Many of the effects of militarization were negative, but individuals learned numerous skills and ways to interact with superiors and with other ethnic groups, forming in many cases strong friendships. After the war was over, some of the San who had served in the military did quite well.

John Marshall and Claire Ritchie arrived at Tsumkwe in July 1980 (John Marshall, personal communication 1987). Socioeconomic and health problems were apparent to them immediately. Some of the most common problems at the Tsumkwe clinic were gunshot and stab wounds. Unemployment levels were high, as was nutritional stress, and despondency was commonplace. As Marshall and Ritchie (1984:8) pointed out, Ju/'hoan society had become divided not only between have and have-nots, but also between elderly and young, and between men and women. The presence of the military in Bushmanland was seen as debilitating and as socially, economically, and environmentally destructive (John Marshall, Claire Ritchie, personal communications, 1987, 1992). !Xun, Khwe, and other San residing in the Ovamboland region witnessed the depletion of game that they had depended on and the expansion of non-San settlement in their areas (Kreike 2004:129–34; Akira Takada, personal communication 2015). Similar trends were identified in West Caprivi in the 1980s, 1990s, and the new millennium (Lenggenhager 2018).

In 1989, after years of fighting, South African Defense Force troops were withdrawn from West Caprivi and the rest of South West Africa. Prior to Namibian independence, which was celebrated on March 21, 1990, approximately 4500 !Xun and Khwe San, former SADF soldiers and their families, opted to leave South West Africa and move to South Africa, where they were resettled at Schmidtsdrift, west of Kimberley in the Northern Cape (Uys 2014:269ff.). Eventually, the !Xun and Khwe were able to get a plot of land of their own at Plaafontein (Herzog 2013; Robbins 2007).

Some of the !Xun and Khwe who decided to remain in West Caprivi sought to maintain their homes in the former SADF camps, while others chose to move into the West Caprivi Game Reserve, where they were allowed to exploit wild plant resources and to get jobs from the Department of Nature Conservation (DNC, later the Ministry of Environment and Tourism; see Taylor 2012). A number of Khwe who remained in the West Caprivi Game Reserve, later designated as Bwabwata National Park, were arrested for hunting and trapping in the 1990s and the early part of the new millennium (Paksi and Pyhälä 2018; Atiila Paksi and Alfred Ndwako, personal communication 2018).

The government of Namibia announced plans in early 1997 to expand their operations and establish a prison farm on the Okavango River near Popa Falls, a prime tourism site that was already being utilized by the Khwe for a community campsite known as N//goavaca. This action was protested by the Khwe, who elicited the support of the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA), Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC), and the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) of Namibia. After extensive efforts to negotiate a settlement, the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) of Namibia filed a legal case against the Ministry of Prisons in the Namibian High Court. This case was settled out of court in 1998, allowing the Khwe to keep their campsite, and the prison farm was moved away from Popa Falls (Boden 2003).

The West Caprivi Game Reserve, which had originally been founded as a game park, was declared a national park (Bwabwata National Park) in 2003. The Khwe living in the park were allowed to remain, although some of their activities were restricted (e.g., hunting, grazing, and collection of wild plant foods, medicines, and firewood). Bwabwata National Park, comprising 5715 km², was seen by the Khwe as part of their ancestral territory, though other groups, including Mbukushu and Kavango, also claimed rights there.

A nongovernment organization, the Kyaramacan Association, was formed in 2005 (Taylor 2012:117–24). The majority of the association's management committee, which consisted of 10 people, was made up of Khwe, although there was also one Mbukushu representative. There were disagreements between the Khwe and the Mbukushu over who should become the recognized Traditional Authority for West Caprivi, and there were conflicts over land and resources, as well (Fisch 1999; Harring and Odendaal 2012; Paksi and Pyhälä 2018; Smith 2007; Taylor 2012). The late 1990s were a problematic period for the Khwe and their neighbors. Periodic attacks were made across the border in West Caprivi by UNITA forces (which during the Angolan war had fought on the side of the South African Defense Force). The Namibian Defense Force (NDF) entered the area periodically in search of UNITA soldiers. Some of the Khwe were caught up in sweeps by the NDF in early to mid-1999, and a number of them were mistreated while they were in detention.

The security situation became even more tense on 2 August 1999 when an attack on the police station, border post, and radio station at Katima Mulilo, as well as a Namibian Defense Force military base, was carried out in what was then East Caprivi. The attack, which resulted in 14 deaths, was carried out by the Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA), made up primarily of Mafwe, Yeei, and Subiya. The Namibian Defense Force fought the people whom they labeled as “secessionists” and “terrorists.” Local people, including some Khwe, were swept up in the fighting and the aftermath (Boden 2003; Fisch 1999; Smith 2007; Zeller 2010). As a result of the conflict, between 2500 and

3000 Caprivians, a sizable portion of whom were Khwe, escaped across the border into Botswana, where some of them sought refuge in the Dukwe refugee camp in eastern Botswana, a camp operated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the government of Botswana.

In August 2000, around 15–18 Khwe disappeared in the Caprivi Region, something that was not reported in the Namibian media until February 2001. In June 2001, SADF and NDF members rounded up more than 80 civilians, mostly !Xun, Khwe, and some Hai//om, on the suspicion of being illegal aliens. On 10 July 2001, a Khwe man, Hans Dikuwa, died while in the custody of the Namibian Defense Force. At first it was said by the government that he was shot while trying to escape. Later the government said that he drowned while attempting to cross the river into Angola. The circumstances of this case remain in doubt and continue to be a point of contention between the Khwe and the government of Namibia. Some of the people who were arrested in the Caprivi uprising remain in jail and have yet to receive a hearing or to have their cases adjudicated before the courts in Namibia (Melber 2014:71–81; anonymous staff member, Legal Assistance Centre, personal communication, 4 December 2018).

Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, died of wounds suffered in a firefight in January 2002. This event opened up the possibility of rapprochement between the Angolan government and UNITA, and between Angola and Namibia. Several dozen !Xun and Khwe began to return to Angola from the Osire refugee camp near Otjivarango once the peace accords between Angola and Namibia were signed in April 2002 (Hitchcock 2017). By late 2002, Khwe were living in five countries in southern Africa: Angola, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zambia. Some Khwe left the Dukwe refugee camp in Botswana in search of jobs, a few going as far afield as Bulawayo and Harare in Zimbabwe.

A number of !Xun, Khwe, and other San maintain that they were discriminated against by the government of Namibia for their perceived roles as supporters of the South African Defense Force during the war and their alleged support of the “secessionists” in northern Namibia in 1999. As a result, some of the Khwe moved to Botswana, while others have returned to Angola in a quest for what they hope will be fair treatment before the law. The main issue that the !Xun, Khwe, Hai//om, and Ju/'hoansi face today, however, is that relating to access to land and competition with other groups, private companies, and with nation-states over what was traditionally considered communal land (Dieckmann et al. 2014).

Zimbabwe: A Case Study in Conflict

During the Zimbabwean war of independence (1965–1980), indigenous peoples such as the Tshwa (Tsua) San (Amasili, Batwa) of western Zimbabwe were subjected to repeated military attacks by government forces. At the same time some Tshwa were also recruited into the liberation forces who were fighting the Rhodesian Army. The Tshwa and their neighbors, the Kalanga and Ndebele, were forcibly resettled into “protected villages” by the Rhodesian government

forces, similar to what the Portuguese did in Angola (Huntley 2017:156). In the protected villages, the equivalent of what in Vietnam were termed “strategic hamlets” and in Guatemala were called “model villages” by the US government, residents were not allowed to have weapons, carry out hunting activities, seek wild plants in the bush, or protect their crops from marauding wildlife.

The Tshwa, who number some 7800 in western Zimbabwe and northern Botswana today, were some of the first San to be removed from a protected area, in this case the Wankie Game Reserve (later, Hwange National Park), in 1927–1928 (Davison 1977; Hitchcock et al. 2015, 2016:16–17, 2018; Haynes n.d.). In 1929, hunting legislation was passed in Rhodesia (the Game and Fish Preservation Act of 1929). As a result of the establishment of the protected status of Hwange and the passage of wildlife conservation laws, local people were required to cease their subsistence hunting activities. Police patrols were carried out to seek “ivory poachers” (Davison 1977:5–6). The game ranger who was appointed to oversee the Hwange area in the late 1920s, Ted Davison, undertook trips into the region to assess its status and to tell Bushmen and other residents that they were breaking the law (Davison 1977:17–24). These efforts were not easy, as noted by Davison, who said, “Bushman who knew the area kept their secrets, refusing to divulge any information at all—probably because they felt this might lead to the arrest of relatives engaged in poaching” (Davison 1977:16). One of his tasks, according to Davison, was to warn people that the area was now a game reserve and that they were not allowed to live there (Davison 1977:20).

The removals of people from southern African protected areas are presented in Table 3. Wankie Game Reserve was the first, but far from the only, protected area from which local people were relocated involuntarily. People in and around the protected areas were also subjected to anti-poaching efforts, which led to arrests and long-term jail sentences in some cases. The Tshwa, for their part, resisted some of these conservation efforts, going back secretly into the reserve and continuing to hunt, gather, and visit places that they considered sacred, such as the graves of loved ones and places where they had conducted rituals in the past.

In the early 1980s, after Zimbabwe achieved its independence, tensions continued to be felt in the country, particularly in Matabeleland, where one of the major groups of freedom fighters, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), had its primary base of support. Some of the former guerrillas felt that they had not been treated appropriately by the new government under Robert Mugabe, and tensions erupted into conflict in late 1980 and early 1981. Several hundred former freedom fighters returned to the bush and began what turned into a low-level insurgency.

Beginning in 1982 and continuing until 1987, the Zimbabwe government under Robert Mugabe carried out counterinsurgency operations against what they termed “dissidents.” These operations included military attacks on villagers in Matabeleland and the Midlands regions of Zimbabwe. The members of the Fifth Brigade, a North Korea-trained military unit that was under the prime minister's office rather than the regular Zimbabwe Army, carried out the attacks. It was this brigade that was said to

Table 3 Protected areas in southern Africa that resulted from the involuntary resettlement of local populations as a means of protecting habitats and wildlife

Park or reserve, establishment date, area (km ²)	Country	Comments
Central Kalahari Game Reserve (1961), 52,730 km ²	Botswana	>2200 G//ui, G//ana, Tsila, and Baboalongwe Bakgalagadi were resettled outside the reserve in 1997 and 2002
Chobe National Park (1961), 9980 km ²	Botswana	Hundreds of Subiya and others were resettled in the Chobe Enclave, in 5 villages within a 3060 km ² area
Etosha National Park (1907) Game Reserve No. 2, (93,240 km ²) reduced in size in 1970 to 22,912 km ²	Namibia	Several hundred Hai//om San were resettled outside of the park and sent to freehold farms in 1954; new relocation on-going (2009–present)
Gemsbok National Park (1931), now Kgalagadi Transfrontier Park (KTP) (April 1999), 37,991 km ²	South Africa, Botswana	Dozens of /Khomani and N/amani San were resettled out of the park in the early 1930s; won co-management rights to the park in 1998
Wankie Game Reserve (1927), 14,651 km ² ; now Hwange National Park (January 29, 1950), 14,651 km ²	Zimbabwe	Tshwa San were rounded up and resettled south of Wankie Game Reserve in the late 1920s and early 1930s
Khaudum Game Reserve (1989); now Khaudum National Park (2007), 3842 km ²	Namibia	Ju/hoansi resettled in 1989 and 2007, mostly to Nyae Nyae including //A/oba
Kruger National Park (1926), 19,485 km ² ; now part of Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park (2002)	South Africa	Protracted effort to resettle Makuleke from Kruger culminated in the relocation of 1500 people in 1969
Moremi Game Reserve (1964), 3880 km ²	Botswana	Bugakwe (//Ani-kxoe) San were relocated out of the reserve in the 1960s and 1970s
West Caprivi Game Park (1963); became Bwabwata National Park (2003), 6277 km ²	Namibia	Kxoe and Mbukushu were resettled out of the game reserve in the early 1960s; multiple use

have been responsible for the killings and disappearances of as many as 20,000 people, whose bodies were deposited in mass graves and old mines that dotted western and central Zimbabwe (Eppel 2014).

This period (1982–1987) became known as Gukurahundi, a term that translates in Shona as “the early rain which washes away the chaff before the spring rains.” There were disappearances, kidnappings, torture of detainees, rapes, beatings, restriction of the movement of food and medicines into the area, removals of children from their parents, and a wide range of other kinds of atrocities against the civilian population (see Catholic Commission 2008; Ngwenya 2018). The attacks led not only to many deaths, but also to arrests, detention, and torture of tens of thousands of others. Judging from testimony and ethnographic research, Ndebele, Kalanga, Nambya, Tonga, and Tshwa were displaced, and >70% of the population in the region lost their livelihoods. Some of the organizations that had been formed to promote community well-being after independence were left in disarray as a result of the attacks (see, e.g., McGregor 2009:156–61).

Some of these events in Zimbabwe in the 1980s were described by an elderly Tshwa man who had been imprisoned during the Zimbabwe war for independence. Subsequently, he was detained by the new government on suspicion of having supported the dissidents. I conducted this interview in Tsholotsho, Zimbabwe, on 26 June 1989. The man requested that his name not be used.

I was living in western Tsholotsho just south of Hwange. I used to live in the game reserve but we were forced to leave by the whites. My father hunted elephants there but he was arrested and put in prison. I helped my mother and brothers and sisters by collecting salt at Sua. But then the war came and the Selous Scouts came to our village and beat us up. My brother was shot as we watched. They kept saying, "You are Bushmen. You should not support the black people." I was glad when Smith lost the war and we got a new government. I voted in the elections. I thought that everything would be good with a new government. The Bushmen would be treated like other people, not flogged with sticks like we were by the white farmers.

Then the killings began. At first it was white people, part of Smith's army, who came to Tsholotsho and shot people. I saw my best friend taken away by the soldiers in a truck. I never saw him again. Many people were taken away. The soldiers came at night. Sometimes they shot people in their beds. They were after Ndebele and Bushmen. They called us dissidents. But we were just people trying to make a living.

At that time the drought was very bad. There were no crops in the fields, and the wild fruits were very few. Even elands were dying in the bush. Then the government said we could not get food. They stopped the trucks from coming to the stores. We were very hungry, and children and old people died of starvation. People even ate their skin blankets and shoes.

It was then that the soldiers in red hats came to my village. They said that we should send women to help them carry water. Later we learned that the women had been raped. Two of the women from our village were shot by the soldiers. The army people would come to Tsholotsho and say that we were dissidents. They pointed to people and they were taken away. Later we heard they had been killed and their bodies dumped into old mines. There were many places where the bodies were left. We would sometimes find them when we were looking for lost cattle.

My close friend Khunou was arrested by the soldiers. They said he had robbed stores and stolen cattle. I told them that he was innocent, but they said, "He is just a Bushman. Bushmen are animals." That night they shot him. His wife and children fled to Botswana after the soldiers burned their houses and killed their chickens.

I was arrested by the soldiers in red hats and taken to an army base. They did not give us food or water. They tortured me by putting my head in water and hitting me on the backside. They kept calling me a "dumb Bushman." Some of the people in the camp with me died from the beatings.

Many innocent people died because of the army. We were just trying to make a living like we always have. But they felt we were just Bushmen. I wondered then why I voted for this government.

The situation in Zimbabwe continues to be complex, not just because of its treatment of indigenous peoples, but in general (Hitchcock et al. 2016, 2018). The carrying out of land reform activities after 2000 saw hundreds of commercial farmers dispossessed, along with the loss of jobs and homes for those who had worked for them. President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF ruling party decided to make even more concerted efforts in the first decade and a half of the twenty-first century to “take back the land” and reallocate it to black farmers, some of them ex-guerilla fighters from the Zimbabwean war of independence. In the process, no Tshwa were allocated farms or land of any kind. As a result, some of the Tshwa moved to Bulawayo in search of jobs, or they went across the border into Botswana where they hoped to be able to get some support from the country’s social safety net.

On 12 January 2009, an international group of experts on genocide, the International Association of Genocide Scholars (IAGS), used the term “genocide” for the first time with regard to the activities of strongman Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. In a statement posted on its website, they called for the UN Security Council to refer Mr. Mugabe to the International Criminal Court for prosecution. “Mugabe is now committing genocide by attrition,” wrote the scholars, which they said falls under the provision of the UN Genocide Convention outlawing acts that “deliberately inflict on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction, in whole or in part.” Such a charge had been made previously by the Ndebele, Kalanga, and Tshwa concerning the Gukurahundi massacres and deprivation of food, medicines, and health programs in Matabeleland and the Midlands (Catholic Commission 2008; Ngwenya 2018).

As one Tshwa said to me in November 2013, the Mugabe government was responsible for planning and implementing a full-scale genocide. The Tsoro-o-tso San Development Trust, along with the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), have called for reparations for the Tshwa, Ndebele, Kalanga, and other people who lost their lives and livelihoods as a result of the actions of the Zimbabwe government. Thus far, there has been no response on the part of either the Mugabe government or the new government under President Emmerson Mnangagwa. The Tshwa continue to press for an apology on the part of the Zimbabwean government for the Gukurahundi genocide and the forced relocations and disappearances that they experienced.

Conclusions

From the perspectives of many San, the anthropological and ethnohistoric arguments about San “peacefulness” and “aggression” have both strengths and weaknesses. Much of the debate about San involvement in warfare (defined here as armed combat between territorial or political communities) fails to contextualize the conditions under which San became involved. Early (late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century) descriptions of San conflict and war (e.g., Lieutenant Hans Kaufman’s description of the $\ne\text{Au//eisi}$ or !Auin at Rietfontein in the northern Kalahari region of German South West Africa (Kaufmann 1910) represented San as bellicose and violent. The $\ne\text{Au//eisi}$ today maintain that those descriptions were not inaccurate but perhaps overblown. They point out that from 1884 on they were dealing with German colonial military forces that were arresting them and attempting to get them to stop hunting and (alleged) taking

of settler livestock. Ju/'hoansi and Naro San make similar observations about the perspectives of Siegfried Passarge (1907), who travelled widely in the northern Kalahari in 1896–1897 at the time of the rinderpest epidemic that had wiped out much of the region's wildlife and livestock. They also note that the San were dealing with settler expansion, drought, and serious natural resource stress, which can be seen in both a decline in the numbers and varieties of natural resources and an expansion in the numbers of people utilizing those resources, exerting greater pressure on them. They see the actions of nineteenth-century Ju/'hoansi, Naro, and other San as understandable responses to outside contact and complex changes in social, economic, and environmental systems.

The San view their involvement in warfare in Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe in the 1970s and 1980s as the result of state-sponsored mistreatment and efforts to incorporate San into military units through taking advantage of their generally poor social economic situations. They realize that they possessed many of the skills which militaries wanted to draw upon (e.g., extensive knowledge of “the bush,” tracking and hunting skills, and willingness to deal with arduous conditions). San hasten to point out, however, that San children are taught to treat each other with respect and dignity and to “turn the other cheek,” avoiding conflict whenever possible and engaging extensively in conflict resolution efforts that restrained potential combatants (Marshall-Thomas 1994). “We avoid aggressive action against other people at all costs,” as a Khwe man told me in East Caprivi in August 1999. Khwe and !Xun who opted to join the South African Defence Force and other militaries in the latter part of the twentieth century often point out that they did so because they saw few other options given the sociopolitical and economic situations with which they were dealing.

Some San admit that they have been both the victims and the perpetrators of violent acts. This does not mean, they say, that they have “warlike tendencies” or “aggressive natures.” Historical circumstances have to be taken into consideration in order to understand the choices made by individuals and groups, they maintain. Tshwa informants in western Zimbabwe and northeastern Botswana admit that there were conflicts over access to high-value natural resources such as morama (*Tylosema esculenta*) and baobab (*Adansonia digitata*) between Tshwa subgroups (e.g., /Aise and Ganade) in the early to mid-twentieth century. Resource stress related in part to population growth and in-migration, they say, contributed to these intra- and intergroup conflicts.

The issue of high murder rates among some San groups (e.g., for Ju/'hoansi, see Marshall and Ritchie 1984; Lee 1979:370–400; Wiessner 2016:s156–58) is a contentious one. Many San argue that they are no more aggressive than are other people (e.g., Americans, South Africans, Germans, Afrikaaners, Herero, Ovambo, Namibians). Mortality rates due to murder vary over time; San maintain that this depends in part on the conditions under which people are operating.

Wiessner (2016:s157, Table 1) shows homicide rates by decade from 1920 to 2009 among the Ju/'hoansi, drawn from the work of Lorna Marshall, John Marshall, Claire Ritchie, and Polly Wiessner. In this table, the elevated homicide rates from 1991 to 2000 can be seen clearly, which was right after the militarization and the war between South African and South West African military and the South West African People's

Organization ended. It should be stressed, however, that Ju/'hoansi both fear and abhor violence—they managed to get the situation in hand in the next decade, and murder rates dropped dramatically. People stopped brewing beer in villages in order to avoid alcohol-fueled violence, conflict resolution efforts were expanded, former soldiers and their families settled down, and domestic violence declined (for discussions of conflict resolution among Ju/'hoansi, see Marshall-Thomas 1994; Wiessner 2014:1429–30).

Some San see themselves in some ways as the targets of aggressive and genocidal acts on the part of settlers, nation-states, political units including political parties, and even nongovernmental organizations. They are deeply concerned about what they see as “coercive conservation” which results in their losing access to their land and livelihoods. Although some San organizations and individuals see genocide as a set of acts intentionally committed to destroy groups in whole or in part, as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (United Nations 1951), others extend the concept to include such actions as intentional prevention of specific ethnic groups from practicing their traditional customs; forced resettlement; denial of access to food relief, health assistance, and development funds; and purposeful destruction of the habitats utilized by indigenous peoples. It is for this reason that so many San have decried the actions of state and nongovernmental organizations seeking the establishment of protected areas and the removal of local communities, and imposition of what they see as unfair restrictions on their subsistence and land-use activities. San have responded to these trends by engaging in social activism, forming community-based institutions, and bringing legal actions aimed at securing human rights and equitable treatment (Sapignoli 2018).

In conclusion, many San see themselves as people who want peace. They point out that their values, which aim to prevent conflict and encourage positive interactions among individuals and groups, are valuable, and ones that they believe all people aspire to. When asked about the debates about indigenous peoples and their perceived tendencies to engage in warfare and aggression, versus the notion that indigenous peoples are “peaceful and harmonious,” San say that they, just like other people, would prefer peace and harmony to aggression, conflict, and war.

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Appendix

Table 4 Author's fieldwork in Southern Africa, 1975–2018

Location	Date(s) of fieldwork	<i>N</i> of interviews	Interviews that mentioned violence (%)
Eastern and northeastern Botswana	August 1975–November 1976	546	11
East-Central Kalahari Botswana	April 1977–April 1979	1872	5
Botswana country-wide	August 1980–August 1982	765	8
Southern Botswana	June 1985	36	2
Nyae Nyae Namibia	May–June 1987	65	26
Botswana country-wide	May–July 1988	124	12
Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe	June–August 1989	116	9
Botswana country-wide	November–December 1989	356	6
Botswana country-wide	May–June 1988	115	22
Botswana country-wide	May–June 1990	485	11
Botswana country-wide	April–July 1991	116	4
Western and northeastern Namibia	May–June 1992	106	5
Western Zimbabwe	June–July 1992	84	58
Northeastern Namibia	July–August 1992	79	6
Namibia and Zimbabwe	June–July, 1994	42	42
Northeastern Namibia	May–June 1995	165	18
Botswana country-wide	August–October 1995	128	4
Zimbabwe	October–November 1995	72	38
Northwestern Botswana	June–August 1995	68	12
Western Zimbabwe	June–July 1999	84	41
Botswana	July 31–August 23, 1999	54	9
Botswana western and central Kalahari	January 8–22, May 16–June 18, 2000	198	11
Central and northeastern Namibia	June–September 2001	141	28
Central Kalahari Botswana	March 1–14, 2004	156	46
Toteng, Botswana	July–August 2005	36	3
Western Botswana	July–August 2011	54	10
Central Namibia	October–November 2011	168	8
Central Botswana	February–March 2012	156	14
Central Namibia	August 19–September 12, 2012	248	7
Zimbabwe	October–November 2013	149	36
Northeastern Namibia	June 2014	31	3
Central and northeastern Botswana	June–July 2014	56	11

Table 4 (continued)

Location	Date(s) of fieldwork	N of interviews	Interviews that mentioned violence (%)
Northeastern Namibia	June–July 2015	56	4
Northeastern Namibia	June–July 2017	82	13
Central Namibia	May–June 2018	26	15
South Africa	June 2018	18	6
Namibia	December 2018	10	50

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